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Abstract
The current COVID-19 pandemic highlights the utility of contact tracing, when combined
with case isolation and social distancing, as an important tool for mitigating the spread of
a disease [1]. Contact tracing provides a mechanism of identifying individuals with a high
likelihood of previous exposure to a contagious disease, allowing additional precautions to be
put in place to prevent continued transmission.
Here we consider a cryptographic approach to contact tracing based on secure two-party
computation (2PC). We begin by considering the problem of comparing a set of location histories
held by two parties to determine whether they have come within some threshold distance while
at the same time maintaining the privacy of the location histories. We propose a solution to this
problem using pre-shared keys, adapted from an equality testing protocol due to Ishai et al [2].
We discuss how this protocol can be used to maintain privacy within practical contact tracing
scenarios, including both app-based approaches and approaches which leverage location history
held by telecoms and internet service providers. We examine the efficiency of this approach
and show that existing infrastructure is sufficient to support anonymised contact tracing at a
national level.
Important note: The authors of this manuscript come from backgrounds in computer science
and physics and claim no special expertise in public health or epidemiology. The purpose of this
paper is to explore the application of multi-party cryptography to the problem of contact tracing.
As such, all references to the role of contact tracing in public health and to the COVID-19 pandemic
more generally are purely to provide context, and should not be taken as authoritative.
1 Introduction
Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) has spread rapidly around the globe, with many governments
and health organisations battling to slow or contain the spread of the disease [3, 4]. In particular,
geofencing and contact tracing have been used extensively to try to contain the virus and to identify
those potentially at risk due to direct contact with confirmed cases. The aim of contact tracing is
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two-fold: to help and manage people who may have been exposed to infectious disease, and to stop
the chain of transmission in order to control the outbreak.
The prevalence of mobile telephones, and in particular smartphones, provide a potentially pow-
erful tool for contact tracing efforts: the vast majority of users carry their devices with them
throughout the day, and the phones themselves are capable of generating detailed location histo-
ries, either via GPS or signal strength .
However, any possible implementation using them has to tackle several issues. Firstly, there is
an issue of privacy. With the availability of users’ location, there is a growing concern that private
data can be used by an unauthorized entity in ways that infringe the individual right to privacy,
for example by profiling user’s behavior, targeting the user by stalking and spamming or drawing
inferences about user’s sensitive data. Unfortunately, there is an ongoing battle between personal
privacy, the approaches used by governments, and the effectiveness of the approaches applied. For
example, in South Korea and Israel, there has been a large public push back against the sharing of
individuals’ intimate information and the use of mass surveillance approaches respectively [5].
Secondly, any scheme that is used has to be both scalable and effective. For example, schemes
that rely on a smartphone application that has to be installed by users on their smartphones can
only be effective if a significant proportion of the population has a smartphone, takes an active
step to install the app, and allows it to run continuously. Further, in many areas, a minority of
people have access to smartphones but may carry other GSM mobile devices that can be a source of
information. For example in 2018 India had a smartphone penetration rate of 26% in comparison to
88% subscription rate to wireless phones [6]. Even in the countries which do not have this problem,
there can be important groups in the society, such as older people, who have smaller smartphone
ownership rates; this is critically important for COVID-19 as older people are in a high risk group
[7, 8]. Such solutions can also struggle to get a large enough proportion of smartphone owners to
use the app. Furthermore, if they rely on a single source of data such as Bluetooth, they might
miss many other ones that are more widespread such as GPS or GSM triangulation.
1.1 Summary of our results
In this work we offer a practical framework for identifying whether two parties have come in close
direct contact based on their absolute locations without disclosing either parties’ location history.
To achieve this, we have developed a simple framework which utilizes techniques from secure two-
party computation (2PC), whereby one party holds a database of private location data within a
virtual private cloud or firewall and the other party holds a database of locations of confirmed
COVID-19 patient locations for the same time period. The first database might be coming, for
example, from a telecommunications service provider while the second is held by the government
(see Figure 1). The goal is to identify if any of the locations in the former database lie within a
threshold distance of locations in the latter database without revealing either database directly. In
the literature this problem is known under the name of private proximity testing [9]
The approach taken in this work is to first reduce the problem of private proximity testing into
a blind contact tracing by an appropriate tessellation of the surface of the Earth [9, 10]. We then
blindly compute a number of matches between each row of the two data sets over a fixed period of
time (e.g. two weeks). In this way, we also hide the exact timestamp of the matching. We achieve
this by modifying the perfectly secure protocol for equality testing presented in [2].
We offer three use cases of how the protocol may be used in practical application to enable
collaboration between government and individuals or IT/telecom companies. Finally, we outline the
implementation details for such an approach, showing that the resource intensity of such protocols
is easily within capacity of modern data centers.
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Figure 1: Outline of some of the parties who perform data collection of their users location with
the proposed blind contact tracing interface between privately held databases and government.
1.2 Related work
Many institutions and governments have already introduced contact tracing smartphone appli-
cations or are currently working on them. Singapore has released TraceTogether [11], Poland
published code for a prototype of their app [12], British NHS and Germany’s Fraunhofer Institute
for Telecommunications are in the completion phases of their solution, all of which are based on the
Bluetooth technology [13]. Chan et al. [14] present a thorough review of contact tracing smartphone
apps based on Bluetooth and presents a new third-party free protocol. The authors specifically do
not consider approaches based on absolute-location, such as ours, due to a cryptographic difficulty
of protecting infected patients’ locations. However, we believe our approach offers a simple and ef-
ficient solution that achieves that objective. The solution closely related to ours has been proposed
by MIT [15]. Their smartphone—Private Kit: Safe Paths—builds location trail from GPS data of
users. In its current iteration, data of infected patients is shared with the government who redacts
them. This is a similar setup to ours however we stress that our solution offers perfect security
against active adversaries. In its third iteration, Private Kit: Safe Paths will not rely on sharing
information with the government but will instead perform a multi-party computation based on
location trails of users. We do not know the proposed protocol, and therefore do not comment on
its security, however both iterations require high participation rates for the solution to be effective.
Upon completion of this work, we became aware of the independent work by Berke et al [16],
which presents an approach for contact tracing problem via the private-set intersection problem.
As far as we know, this is the only result that achieves the same functionality (c.f. Definition 2.1
below) in the context of contact tracing. In the setting of computational security, the authors
introduce a hash-based protocol with only two parties: the sender (server) and the receiver (client)
without requiring the trusted dealer. They also provide an adaption of a Diffie-Hellman protocol
as an example. On the other hand, we take the information-theoretic approach with the added
assumption of trusted randomness dealer.
Other cryptographic articles that are mostly related to ours concern private proximity test-
ing. In particular, Narayanan et al. [9] did a reduction of private proximity testing protocols to
private equality testing. However it outputs time and position to the receiver, which we try to
avoid in our setting. Sˇedeˇnka and Gasti [17] have studied proximity testing on Earth based on
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distance computation. However their functionality necessarily has a security weakness that allows
for triangulation.
2 Technical description the protocol
2.1 Setup
In this article, we are interested in the secure computation for two-parties with a trusted dealer.
The task of a trusted dealer is to instantiate a randomness distribution phase that will allow the
two parties (sender and receiver) to securely compute a joint function. To aid with exposition, we
will use a running example with a receiver called Alice and a sender called Bob.
Given the receiver and sender locations, denoted as {pat} and {pbt} respectively, the receiver
learns how many times she was in proximity to the sender i.e. how many times D(pat , pbt) < ∆,
where D is a distance measure, ∆ is the threshold, and we assume that the locations are provided at
discrete time points. The sender receives no output and additionally, we require both the parties not
to learn anything about the other party’s location or database. This is a modified blind proximity
testing problem. However, we can reduce it to a blind contact tracing problem by tessellating the
surface of the Earth (the choice of the grid for which is described in Section 4.1). After doing this,
the locations of Alice and Bob {xt}, {yt} are discrete and correspond to the unit cells in the grid.
This reduction allows us to consider the joint function as equality on the input of the sender and
receiver. The goal is to check for all t if xt = yt and output the total number of matches, N , to
the receiver without leaking anything about the t. However, when the receiver’s input matches the
sender’s input for all the t then receiver can trivially guess the sender’s location. This functionality
is inspired by the privacy-preserving equality testing where output yt is leaked to the receiver when
xt = yt. Note that both the functionalities of equality testing and contact tracing achieve the same
task of privacy-preserving equality with the same security against the malicious sender but different
security requirements when receiver is adversarial. The ideal functionality for blind contact tracing
can be defined in the following way.
Definition 2.1. Ideal functionality for blind contact tracing. The ideal functionality for
blind contact tracing Sbct({xt}, {yy}) for a receiver with input {xt} and sender with input {yt} is
given by the following procedure:
1. Take in receiver’s input {xt} and sender’s input {yt}
2. Compute N =
∑
t st where st = 1 if xt = yt else si = 0
3. Return N to the receiver and nothing to the sender.
This provides correctness and perfect security against dishonest parties (sender or receiver).
2.2 Presentation of the protocol
Our concrete protocol for the blind contact tracing is adapted from the equality testing protocol
of Ishai et al. [2]. The blind contact tracing protocol is divided into two phases: key generation
and computation. The first stage consists of three parties - trusted dealer, sender, receiver and
proceeds in the following way. The sender and receiver requests correlated randomness from the
trusted dealer and sends a pre-agreed (between sender and receiver) input t. The trusted dealer
samples a tuple of permutations (Pt, Q) where Pt is 2-wise independent permutation chosen from a
family of permutation and Q is uniformly independent, chosen from Sn. It also generates uniformly
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random string rt. The trusted dealer sends the set ({Pt}, Q) to sender and ({rt}, {sQ(t)}) to receiver
where sQ(t) = Pt(rt).
Upon receiving the randomness in the key generation phase, the sender and receiver proceed
with the computation phase. It consists of one round of communication between the sender and
the receiver. As a first step: receiver performs a one-time pad of their private input {xt} with the
random strings {rt} to obtain ut where ut = xt + rt. The receiver sends {ut} to the sender. In the
next step, the sender performs one-time pad of their private input {yt} with the string obtained
from the receiver in the first step (ut) and permutes it using the permutation Pt. The sender sends
vQ(t) where vQ(t) = Pt(ut − yt) to the receiver. As the final step, the receiver checks if sQ(t) is
equivalent to the string vQ(t) received from sender for every t. The receiver calculates the total
number of matches N . We describe the blind contact tracing in Protocol 1.
Protocol 1 Blind Contact Tracing Protocol
Receiver’s input: private location data {xt ∈ X|t ∈ [n]}
Sender’s input: private location data {yt ∈ X|t ∈ [n]}
Receiver’s output: N (total number of matches)
1. Key generation (trusted dealer, sender, receiver):
1.1. Sample random 2-wise independent permutations Pt : X 7→ X and uniformly indepen-
dent permutation Q ∈ Sn where Sn is the nth symmetric group and random strings
rt ∈ X.
1.2. The sender gets ({Pt}, Q) and the receiver gets ({rt}, {sQ(t)}), where sQ(t) = Pt(rt).
2. Computation (sender, receiver):
2.1. The receiver computes ut = xt + rt and sends the collection {ut} to sender.
2.2. The sender computes vQ(t) = Pt(ut − yt) and sends the permuted collection {vQ(t)} to
the receiver.
2.3. The receiver then compares sQ(t) to vQ(t) and outputs N , where N :=
∑
Q(t)wQ(t) and
wQ(t) = 1 if sQ(t) = vQ(t) otherwise wQ(t) = 0.
2.3 Informal security argument
We now present an informal security argument, with more formal demonstrations presented in
Appendix A. The correctness follows from the correctness of the one-time pad and permutation
(2-wise and uniform). For the privacy of the receiver’s input against a dishonest sender we argue
in the following way. Note that the sender receives ({Pt}, Q) from trusted dealer during the key
generation phase and {xt + rt} from the receiver in the computation phase. The security of {xt}
reduces to the one-time pad, assuming the trusted dealer doesn’t collude with the sender and
generates uniformly random bits. The privacy of the sender’s input against a dishonest receiver is
the following. In a single run of protocol, the receiver obtains ({rt}, {sQ(t)}) from the trusted dealer
and {vQ(t) = Pt(ut − yt)} from the sender. The sender’s input privacy follows from the security
guarantee of 2-wise random permutation and under the same assumption of no-collusion between
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the trusted dealer and the receiver. The receiver checks if vQ(t) = sQ(t), but it doesn’t get any
information about t since Q is a random permutation over t.
It is not difficult to verify that the blind contact tracing protocol is perfectly secure against
active adversaries and is optimal in terms of communication complexity ( as shown in [2]. We
also note that information theoretic security in two-party computation is not possible in the plain
model unless certain assumptions such as trusted agents or shared secrets are made. Thus, our
assumption of the trusted dealer can be justified in the sense that it allows us to achieve a strong
security notion (information-theoretic) while preserving the efficiency of the protocol. Since the
trusted dealer is never involved in the computation phase, as long as it do not collude with either
of the parties, the protocol remain secure against any other attack by the trusted dealer.
3 Defining the receiver for COVID-19
Up until now, we have presented our protocol in terms of an arbitrary receiver and sender. However,
in the implementation and depending on the objectives one needs to specify who the receiver is.
Here we consider three cases specific to COVID-19.
1. An individual is the receiver and the government is the sender. The privacy of
the individual, in that case, is guaranteed straightforwardly by the security of blind contact
tracing protocol. In practice, this requires direct communication between the individual and
the government while the individuals would have to possess the database with their location
trails.
2. Service Provider (IT/Telecom company) is the receiver, the governmental body
is the sender. This is a scenario under which the service provider is the receiver and it
notifies the users whether they were in contact with an infected person or not. In practice,
this is easier to implement than the previous scenario. Again, blind contact tracing protocol
offers perfect security in that case under the assumption the service provider is not colluding
with the government, which is in any case, the assumption whenever any such service is used.
3. Government is the receiver. The scenario under which the government is the receiver
might be particularly useful if the government wants to learn about the statistics of people
who were in the proximity of infected patients. If it wishes so, the government could then
either directly or via service provider inform the individual of their risk, without knowing
their identity.
4 Implementation
To determine the feasibility of our approach to applications, such us contract tracing for COVID-19,
we implement the blind contact tracing protocol using severless infrastructure available on cloud
computing platforms. The first crucial elements to consider in the implementation is the input data
and the grid construction that we apply to it. The second one is the resource intensiveness. We
discuss both in more detail in the following sections.
4.1 Input data and grid construction
The raw input to the protocol may come in a variety of forms such as GPS location information,
GSM triangulation data, Bluetooth beacons, and router mac addresses amongst others. In many
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cases, we can expect the input to be a continuous value such as longitude and latitude. To make
this data fit the paradigm of the blind contact tracing, we need to map locations to some discrete
tiling over the surface of the earth. There are a few ways to do this such as constructing a square
grid or hexagonal patterns, which are more efficient in terms of search queries, as seen in [9]. Both
approaches satisfy the protocols correctness. The second consideration is that the Earth is not
flat. To avoid error we must scale the mapping of location to tiles depending on the location
on earth we are considering. In [17], the Haversine approximation as outlined which approximates
Earth as a sphere and has an approximation error rate of < 0.1%. We used an alternative approach,
recommended by the FCC [18], which uses an ellipsoid approximation to earth and has significantly
less error over distance under a few hundred kilometers. To scale GPS coordinates to kilometers
under this approximation we calculate two constants which we multiply the latitude and longitude
by
CLat = 111.13209− 0.56605 cos(2Lpi/180) + 0.0012 cos(4Lpi/180)
CLon = 111.41513 cos(Lpi/180)− 0.09455 cos(3Lpi/180) + 0.00012 cos(5Lpi/180)
where L is the longitude of the point of interest.
4.2 Resource Intensiveness
An important property of the proposed solution is its ability to scale to deal with contact tracing
at a national level. To this end, it is trivial to show how the solution scales at a constant rate for
the data. The approach is easily run in parallel across containers to meet the demand required.
To get a ballpark estimate of the demand let us consider the scenario for a small, medium and
large state based on estimated figures taken from Ireland, Poland and Japan roughly at the time
of publication. We have also included similar comparisons at a synthetic city level of abstraction.
We search a 3 × 3 overlapping grid of 7 × 7 meters each about a location to look for a match to
avoid edge effects. We also check a time window of 40 minutes around the timestamp associated
with a location. Time is quantized into 20 minute periods and we search for paths crossed in a
single day for exemplary purposes. Of course, if we were to ignore edge effects we could reduce the
over head by a small factor or if we wished to increase accuracy we could sample a finer resolution
of accuracy about each point. This trade off is left to the users of the protocol.
Nation City
Size Small Medium Large Small Medium Large
Population (M) 4.83 37.98 1339 1 5 20
Cases 5364 4666 5172 100 200 500
Keys (TB) 6.1 ×102 4.2 ×103 1.1 ×104 2.35 23.5 235.7
Comms (TB) 8.5 ×102 5.8 ×103 1.6 ×104 3.3 33.0 330.0
Table 1: The table outlines the keys required (Keys) and communication overhead (Comms) to
identify paths of the entire population of countries and cities that crossed with COVID-19 patients.
While the above numbers are, of course, rough estimates it gives us confidence that the proposed
solution is feasible leveraging available cloud services. These figures are also making the naive
assumption that one would cross-check confirmed cases with the entire country, rather than for
example cross-check on a state by state level. For example, on Amazon Web Services 25Gb/s
communication interfaces are currently available and on Oracle Cloud up to 100Gb/s communi-
cation interfaces are available per instance. Similar IO rates can be found with Microsoft Azure,
Google Cloud, and other major cloud providers. In parallel systems we can transfer and compute
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many times this amount. While these requirements are certainly not negligible, they are technically
feasible for deployment.
5 Conclusions
In this work we endeavour to overcome the potential challenges faced by computational security
approaches in the context of contact tracing. The proposed protocol offers an information the-
oretic security and is optimal in terms of communication complexity. Furthermore, our solution
has advantages in terms of effectiveness. It can use different sources of geolocation data such as
GPS, cell-towers triangulation, Bluetooth or WiFi routers, and is not restricted to a single mode.
Importantly it can be used on historic data collected by different means. It can be readily imple-
mented on existing infrastructure by governmental institutions and third parties that have access
to geolocation data including telecommunication service providers or IT enterprises. As such, it
does not require installation of a separate smartphone application. By using cloud computing in-
frastructure, we have developed a scalable key generation service to facilitate these efforts. Access
to the service, along with a lightweight library in Python to leverage service, is available to the
wider community upon request1.
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A Security proofs
An important question for public privacy is how difficult would it be for an adversarial government
to query the database in order to perform mass surveillance and tracking of citizens.
We require a blind contact tracing protocol to satisfy two properties: correctness and input
privacy. The former deals with the setting when all the parties (sender, receiver, dealer) follow the
steps of the protocol as described in Protocol 1. For the latter, we consider two sub-cases - a) the
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receiver’s input privacy when the sender is cheating and b) the sender’s input privacy when the
receiver is cheating. It is important to note that we assume that a trusted dealer behaves honestly
and does not collaborate with any malicious party.
Definition A.1 (Correctness). We say that a blind contact tracing protocol Px,y (where both the
parties sender and receiver are honest) is correct if for all inputs (x, y) the parties output from
running the protocol Px,y is exactly equal to the output of parties in ideal blind contact tracing
functionality Sbct(x, y).
Theorem A.2 (Correctness). The blind contact tracing protocol shown in Protocol 1 is perfectly
correct. That is for every random 2-wise permutation Pt : X 7→ X, uniformly random permutation
Q ∈ Sn, every message rt ∈ X, sQ(t) (with sQ(t) = Pt(r(t))) and every input {xt ∈ X|t ∈ [n]},
{yt ∈ X|t ∈ [n]} it holds that receiver obtains N :=
∑
Q(t)wQ(t) =
∑
k zk, where zk is 1 if xk = yk
otherwise 0. On the other hand, the sender obtains no output.
Proof. The correctness follows straightforwardly from the property of 2-wise permutation Pt and
uniformly random permutation Q as well as the correctness of one-time pad. The output N is
incremented on the receiver side if and only if xt − yt is nonzero. To see this, let’s consider
vQ(t) − sQ(t) = Pt(ut − yt)− Pt(rt) = Pt(ut − yt − rt) (1)
As we know, the receiver computes ut = xt + rt, therefore Eq. 1 can be equivalently written as
vQ(t) − sQ(t) = Pt(xt − yt) (2)
Therefore, vQ(t) = sQ(t) if and only if xt = yt. Thus, N :=
∑
Q(t)wQ(t) =
∑
Q(t) zQ(t).
Definition A.3 (Privacy against malicious party). We say that a blind contact tracing protocol
P(x, y) is:
1. secure against dishonest receiver if it does not leak anything about sender’s input y except N
(total number of i’s where xi = yi).
2. secure against dishonest sender if it does not leak anything about receiver’s input x.
Theorem A.4 (Privacy against malicious party). The blind contact tracing protocol shown in
Protocol 1 is perfectly secure against a malicious sender or a malicious receiver (assuming the
trusted dealer doesn’t collude with any adversarial party).
Proof. The security proof of Protocol 1 is only a slight modification of the one presented in [2] and
uses a simulation proof technique [19]. We shall construct a simulator that creates a view for the
adversary’s which is indistinguishable from the real execution of the protocol. The simulator holds
all the information from the key generation part i.e. ({Pt}, Q, {rt}, {sQ(t)}). Now consider the two
cases of malicious sender or malicious receiver.
1. Malicious sender: The simulator generates randomly ut and send it to the adversary (the
sender). The simulator receives vQ(t) from the adversary and computes yt = ut −P−1t (vQ(t)).
It sends yt to the ideal blind contact tracing functionality Sbct.
2. Malicious receiver - The simulator calculates xt = ut − rt. and inputs it to the ideal blind
contact tracing functionality Sbct. If the ideal functionality outputs 1, the simulator sends sQ(t)
to the adversary. If it outputs 0, the simulator chooses randomly vQ(t) such that vQ(t) 6= sQ(t)
and sends it to the adversary.
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